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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION OF ALL
THE RIGHTS TO USE OF WATER,
BOTH SURF ACE AND UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE BEAR RIVER
IN RICH COUNTY, UTAH.
RICH COUNTY-OTTER CREEK IRRIGATION COMPANY, and WILLIAM T. REX, RAYMOND L.
HOFFMAN, HENRY T. NICHOLLS,
EMl\TA IRETA ARGYLE, FRANK
H. JACKSON and ADEN W. THORNOCK,
Respondents and Cross Appellants,
vs.
GRANT LAMBORN, H,OWARD L.
LAMBORN and KEITH JESSOP,
Appellants.

Case No. 9285

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
The Appellants are attempting to extend their
use to irrigate 355 acres to July 1st and Respondents have cross appealed, contending the
trial court erred in finding the appellants had
acquired any rights to adverse use and that appellants use is limited to the irrigation of 180 acres
as decreed by Judge Call.
1
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It is the Respondent's position Appellants have
not acquired any rights in excess of those granted
to the Appellants' predecessor in interest by the
Judge Call decree of 1919, and the trial court erred
in finding that Appellants' predecessor in interest
had between 1919 and 1939 acquired by adverse
use the right, to June 1st of each year, to use sufficient water to irrigate 355 acres of land, or 175
acres in addition to that granted by the decree.
Respondents rely on two propositions for reversal: ( 1) The trial court having found interruptions in the use of the water as of June 1st they are
entitled to a finding, as a matter of law, that no
adverse rights were acquired and (2) a person cannot acquire adverse rights while subject to an injunction.
The use of the word "Respondents" herein shall
include a reference to Respondents and/or their
predecessors in interest, and Respondents as crossappellants.
FACTS
We shall hereafter set forth facts in addition
to those indicated by the Appellants and shall note
wherein we disagree.
The respondents and appellants agree they
are bound by the provisions of Judge Call's
Decree of 1919, except appellants claim they have
2
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adversed the defendants for additional water up
to the first of J tlly. ( R. 8-9)
Otter Creek is a natural water course consisting of the north, middle and south forks which
flows from a westerly to an easterly direction, within Rich County, through the lands of the appellants
and respondents; the lands of the appellants are
located above the lands of the respondents and the
water first reaches the lands of the appellants
(Findings of Fact, Case No. 43) .
The Call Decree awarded to the respondents
sufficient water to irrigate 1960 acres with seepage
and overflow rights:
'' ... are the owners of and entitled at
all times during the irrigation season of each
and every year, to-wit, from April 1st to
November 1st, to divert and use the flow of
the waters from the south, middle and north
forks of Otter Creek in Rich County, Utah,
a sufficient quantity of water to irrigate 1960
acres for the irrigation of their lands, the
watering of stock, and for domestic use, and
in addition are the owners of, and entitled
to their respective share and proportion of
all seepage and underflow of water which
drains into said Otter Creek, and from the
various branches thereof, by such irrigation,
on a basis which 1960 acres bears to the total
of 2140 acres." (P 1 of Call's Decree, Case
No. 43)
And Richard Jackson and his successors in interest
were enjoined, during April 1st and November 1st
3
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of each and every year, from diverting or using
more water than was necessary to irrigate 180
acres of land plus his respective share of seepage,
overflow and domestic rights. (P 2, Call Decree,
Case No. 43).
The Call Decree was silent as to priority. However, Judge Jones decreed the rights of the appellants and respondents were equal and he modifed
the Call Decree to provide for water duty of three
acre feet of water per acre per year (Case No. 299,
page 21-24).
Mr. Neville, the Engineer, did not accept the
appointment to administer the stream and Judge
Call on October 1, 1920 revoked his appointment
and appointed Jesse J. Read in his place (Case
No. 43). This appointment was agreeable to and
concurred in by Richard Jackson, the appellants'
predecessor in interest (R 118-119). It does not
appear that Mr. Read acted, however, until 1927
(R 159).
The provisions of the State Engineer's proposed
Decree was arrived at in ignorance of Judge Call's
Decree, although it had been filed with his office,
it had been stored in the b·asement of the State
Capitol Bt1ilding. The mem·bers of his office were
unacquainted with its provisions (R 202, 216). The
proposed Decree would have awarded 10 c.f.s. of
water, with a priority of 18'70, to appellants to
4
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irrigate 355 acres, April 1st to October 1st of each
year and the balance of the stream 3.5 c.f.s. was
to be awarded to the respondents to irrigate their
2190 acres of land, notwithstanding that after July
1st all of respondents land must be irrigated from
Otter Creek. The creek has a constant flow of 13.5
c.f.s. The State Engineer fixed a duty of 1 c.f.s. to
60 acres (R 207, 210-212, 135-136, 177).
Any attempt by appellant's predecessors in interest to use water in addition to that awarded by
the Call Decree was several times each year, with
the knowledge of the appellants' predecessors in
interest (the Jacksons) interrupted by the respondents, and they not only went upstream and took
their water but they employed engineers, water
masters and built diversion dams to insure their
receiving that portion of the water awarded them
by Judge Call (R 105-109, 153-155, 130, 150, 142143, 193, 121-123-124-125, 157-158-159, 12'9-130,
111-112, 134-136, 163-164, 160-161, 182, 172-173,
169).
Sometime prior to 1919 wooden weirs were
placed in the Creek at the Jackson property to divide
the water between the Jacksons and the lower users,
the respondents. The weirs became obsolete ·and
the division was made by the use of earth dams
until1927 when they were rebuilt by Jesse J. Read.
(R 108-110, 159). As rebuilt they were in use until
5
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1930 when they were replaced (R 130-135).
We admit appellants' predecessors in interest
claim they had irrigated their lands between 1919
and 1939 as they had prior to the entry of the Call
Decree. In so doing, however, they did not limit
their claim to July 1st, in the Court below, but insisted the adverse period extended over the irrigation period from April 1st to November 1st of each
year. They urged the trial Court to approve the
proposed decree of the State Engineer which would
have granted them the right to irrigate 355 acres
from April 1st to October 1st of each year. (Findings of Fact, Counterclaim of Richard Jackson in
Case No. 43, State Engineer's proposed Decree pages
159-161, R 2). Appellants in their statement of
points on appeal No.2 allege:
"The Court erred in failing to hold that
the respondents and appellants and their predecessors in interest have at all times since
the Call Decree entered in December, 1919
openly, notoriously, continuously and adversely used the water of Otter Creek through the
irrig~ation season to mature crops on their
355 acres of land." (page 35, Case No. 299)
Emphasis added.
The use of the word "respondents" in the designation was undoubtedly inadvertently included.
The appellants and respondents use of Otter
Creek was continuous and not intermittent (R 386
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41-48, 62, 15-18, 111, 112, 113-114, 180, 129-132135-137, 159-161, 134-137).
Although, the ,Jacksons continued to use the
same irrigation system or ditches as prior to 1919,
they were attempting to spread the water decreed
over the 355 acre tract, except such times as they
were wrongfully using the respondents water. They
did not cut the acreage but the water used (R 117,
129-130, 132, 17 4-175, 197).
We agree that some of the respondents testified they had adequate water except for dry years
until the Woodruff C·anal water was turned off on
July 1st, for their land below the canal. This does not
apply to all of the respondents and particularly this
is not true as to the lands lying above the Canal.

CROSS APPEAL
POINT RELIED ON
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
APPELLANTS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST HAVE AT ALL TIMES SINCE THE CALL
DECREE ENTERED IN DECEMBER OF 1919, OPENLY, NOTORIOUSLY, CONTINUOUSLY AND ADVERSELY USED THE WATERS OF OTTER CREEK ON THEIR
355 ACRES OF LAND FROM APRIL 1ST TO J'UNE
1ST OF EACH IRRIGATION SEASON. (P. 39, CASE
299)

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT HAVING FOUND INTERRUPTIONS AS OF JUNE 1ST RESPON7
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DENTS ARE ENTITLED TO A FINDING AS
A MATTER OF LAW, THAT NO ADVERSE
RIGHTS ~/ERE ACQUIRED IRRESPECTIVE
OF V/HETHER THE USE WAS FOR THE IRRIGATION SEASON OR TO JULY 1ST.
The respondents and appellants agree they are
bound by Judge Call's Decree except that since its
entry appellants claim they have acquired a right
by adverse use to irrigate 35'5 acres of land to July
1st. They did not claim this limitation before the
trial court but on the contrary insisted that the
usage extended throughout the irrigation season,
as they urged: ( 1) the Court to approve the State
Engineer's proposed decree that would have confirmed their right to irrigate 355 acres for the irrigation season (R 2, Proposed decree 158-159). (2)
They attempted to establish that they had used the
water durin·g the period 1919 to 1939 in the same
manner as they had used it prior to the entry of the
decree in 1919 and in those proceedings they claimed
the use from April 1st to November 1st. (See counterclaim Richard Jackson Case No. 43) and ( 3)
In their points relied on for this appeal, they assigned as error the trial court's failure to decree their
rights to irrigate 355 acres for the irrigation season
(p. 35 Case No. 299).
Appellants are now retreating from their position before the trial court, realizing that interrup8
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tions whether they are of June 1st or July 1st is
effective to interrupt the adverse period, where they
claim a use for the irrigation season.
As pointed out the trial court found interruptions in the uses as of June 1st and in this
respect appellants agree there is evidence to support
the finding.
This Court in Wellsville East Field 11~rigation
Co. vs. Linds,ay Land and Livestock Co., 104 Utah,
48, 137, Pac. 2d, 643, the decision relied on by the
appellants, laid down the rule that an interruption
during the period of use interrupts the running
of the adverse period, and the trial court having
found interruptions as of June 1st the respondents
are entitled as a matter of law to a finding and
decree that the appellants did not acquire any rights
by adverse use.
Appellants maintain that the facts in Wellsville E,ast Field Irrig~ation Co. vs. Lindsay Land and
Livestock Coo, supra, are similar to this case. This
is not so, for in that case there was no interruption
during the period of adverse use. Nichols the adverser, used the water approximately two days of
each ten days on one tract from June to September,
inclusive and on the other tract he watered it four
times a season. Mter irrigating the land he would
shut the water off. There was no evidence that an
interruption occurred during this limited period of
9
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use. On one occasion when he was seen using the
water, he was requested to cooperate and use it
sparingly to which he agreed stating he would use
it proportionately as did the others and that he
would turn it off when he finished irrigating. The
Irrigation Company did not interfere with his use.
Nichols situation was clearly one of rotation with
the other users on a fixed rotation schedule, while
here the use of the water by appellants predecessors
in interest was conti11uous. They continuously used
approximately 1/12 of the stream during the irrigation season and 11/12 of the stream was continuously used by the respondents as their proportionate
share as determined by the Call Decree and when
appellants predecessors in interest were using the
water in excess of that awarded them this use was
also continuous. They merely increased the amount
of water over that awarded by the Court. Each year
the respondents on several occasions with the knowledeg and help of the appellants predecessors in interest during the claimed adverse period recaptured
their water.
CONTINUOUS USE
The appellants relied on the testimony of Lem
Jackson in claiming intermittent use (R 38-41).
However, he did not testify to this but rather that
the use was continuous; that they irrigated daily
from Otter Creek and that one or more dams were
10
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always in place and that the water was always running in one of their irrigation ditches; that although
he was not on the ditches all the time he was irrigating continuously (R 38-41, 48) and their witness
Melvin Jackson testified that the dams diverting
the water on to appellants property were never out
until after haying time (R 61-62).
In attempting to establish adverse use the
sons of Richard Jackson testified they used the
water from 1919 to 1939 in the same manner
as they had used it prior to the entry of the Call
decree. In the pleadings in that case Civil No. 43
the appellant Richard Jackson alleged that he had
contin~tously used sufficient water from Otter Creek
to irrigate 380.22 acres of land during the period
April 1st to November 1st of each year. (See paragraph 2 of counterclaim Case No. 43). That appellants claimed the use was continuous before the trial
court is apparent from paragraph 2 of their "statement of points relied on appeal" for therein they
stated the Court erred in failing to hold that appellants had continuously and adversely used the water
of Otter Creek through the irrigation season (Page
35, Case No. 299).
That the use was continuous and not intermittent is, also, supported by the fact that weirs were
used for dividing the water at the Jackson ranch
and that the Jacksons and respondents divided 1/12
11
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to the Jacksons and 11/12 to the respondents or their
proportionate share of the water (R 106-13, 134,
159-160, 165-169).
INTERRUPTIONS
As a result of Richard Jackson, one of appellants' predecessors in interest, attempt to enlarge
his rights in the use of Otter Creek, criminal and
civil actions and Judge Call's decree followed. Thereafter, as they had prior to the entry of the decree,
the respondents were vigilant in interrupting the
Jacksons use of their water. They not only went
upstream each year to the Jackson property, recaptured their water, with the Jackson's knowledge,
and diverted it downstream; but they employed
water masters, engineers and constructed diversion
dams to accomplish this purpose.
It was not merely a matter of respondents once
a year recapturing their water but it was a continuous operation beginning as some testified in
early May and not later than the first of June and
continuing thereafter until the middle of July. (R
193, 153-155, 130, 150, 142-143, 123-124, 157).
William T. Rex, who irrigated from all three
forks (R 131) testified that one of the respon·dents
in at least every five year period, talked with the
Jacksons, at the Jackson property and turned the
water down (R 123-125). He said:
Q. And when it got lower, what did
you do?
12
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A. Why, somebody would go up and talk
to Jackson, get them to let loose a bit and
come dow11.
Q. ,..fhen you'd get more water down
there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now was that done, would you say,
frequently after 1919 up to 1940?
A. I think so, yes.
Q. About how often?
A. Maybe every week sometime maybe
twice a month or something like that somebody would go up.
And Frank Jackson, a respondent, testified
that several times each year, between 1919 and 1940,
beginning not later than June 1st and extending
through the middle of July, one of the respondents
would go up to the Jacksons and turn their water
down.
A. We'd have to try and locate it, bring
some more down.
Q. Now would you say that that happened from the time the decree was entered
up until say 1940?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And about how often would you say
they'd go up during that period of time?
A. Well, some years it would be quite
regular. Probably once or twice a week, maybe
more than that. Other times, according to the
13
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amount of water we got down to our diversion, it would be less ( R 19-28 page 142) .
When you consider the foregoing testimony,
it explains and clarifies the witnesses statements
the interruptions occurred in May up to and into
the middle of July.
As to the date of interruptions, the respondent
Mrs. Argyle testified the respondents required their
water the first of May of each year (R 192) and
that they recaptured it the forepart of May of each
year (R 193). She said:
Ao Well, they tried to get it around the
first of May when Mr. Jackson and Thornock
and Hoffman could go up to the divider or
splitter, we called it.
Q. And would you say that that happened, that you got the water that early from
-how often would you say from 1919 to
1929?
A. Well, it would be the fore part of
May always.
Q. The fore part of May always?
A. Yes.
Q. Each year?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you know that of your own
knowledge?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hoffman who acquired his property in
1922 (R 153) said each year from 1923 through
14
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the 1940's in the spring, someone went upstream
and recaptured the respondents water from the
Jacksons (R 153-157).
A. Each succeeding year we went up,
some of us. Not always the same men, but we
went up each year, put in the dams and
brought our water down to irrigate our
ground with.
and again he said :
Q. And about how often, over what period of years did you have to go up there in
order to secure your water?
A. Oh, we went - I went every year
from 1923 until on up into the 1940's.
Q. Until the forties?
A. Yes.
and that they divided the water allowing Richard
Jackson sufficient water to irrigate 180 acres:
Q. Do you recall in what proportions
that the water was divided?
A. It was divided giving Richard Jackson 180 acres.
Q. 180 acres?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hellstrom, who sold out to Mr. Hoffman
in 1922, testified they went upstream retaking their
water between the first of May and the middle of
July (R 83). He said:
A.

It would be somewhere right between
15
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May and - the first of May and the middle
of July, somewhere along in there. That's
the time we irrigate.
William Rex testified they went up in May,
June and the early part of July for their water (R
130). He said:
Q. Do you know during what period of
time that you was short of water and went up
to get water, about what time of the year?
A. Well, it would be along in the summertime, along in May or June, the early
part of July.
Q. And when it would get short you'd
go up and talk to Dick about it, is that right?
A. Yes, sir, that's right.
The respondent Frank Jackson said they went
up yearly between 1919 and 1940 and retook their
water from the first of June through July (R 142,
150). He said:
A. Well, they went up to try to get more
water down.
Q. Now, after they had been up there,
did you observe whether or not there was
more water came down?
A. Well, most times there was.
Q. There was. Do you recall about what
time of the year that would be?
A. Well, it would usually be from the
first of June on up through July, into July.
Usually fared pretty well up until that time.
Q. And then it was16
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A. The water would get short.
Q. And when it would get short
A. We'd have to try and locate it, bring
some more down.
Q. Now would you say that that happened from the time the decree was entered
up until say 1940?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And about how often would you say
they'd go up during that period of time?
A. Well, some years it would be quite
regular. Probably once or twice a week, maybe
more than that. Other times, according to the
amount of water we got down to our diversion, it would 'be less. ( R 142)
The respondent Mr. Nichols testified that although he could not recall the dates or the years
that they went up almost every year and retook their
water (R 111-112). He said:
Q. Between 1919 and 1940.
A. Yes, I guess there was. We was up
there al1nost every year, but I just couldn't
recall the dates or even the years, because we
were up there almost very year. Someone
wasQ. Now, "every year", you're speaking
of what period of time?
A. Well, I wasn't there during the years
of from the middle of 1920 until I believe it
was in either '23 or '24.
Q. But other years you were there?
17
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A. Other years I was there.
Q. Other years you have personally gone
up the ditch for your water?
A. That's correct.
Q. On all of those occasions, Mr. Nicholls, were you successful in having the water
turned down?
A. I was.
Q. And on all of those occasions how
was that achieved by you?
A. By getting it turned down?
Q. Yes.
A. Well, I always went and talked to
them. I never did tear the dams out alone.
I always went and got them and they helped
me divide it.
Q. Whom do you speak of as "them"?
A. Well, whoever was on the Jackson
place.
Q. Irrigating for the Jacksons?
A. That's right.
The respondents witnesses Nichols, William
Rex, Charles Rex, Frank Jackson, and Hoffman
testified that when they went upstream to the Jacksons for the purpose of recapturing their water,
that they took, often with the Jacksons help, 11./12
of the stream and left 1/12 for the Jacksons use.
(R 105-109, 110-115, 125, 129-130, 134, 136-137,
144-147, 149, 156, 161, 164-166, 169-170, 194-196.)
18
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The respondents not only recaptured their water
but in so doing appellants predecessors in interest
had knowledge that they were doing so. This knowledge was brought home to the Jacksons in several
ways: (1) The Jacksons use was interrupted while
they were in actual use of the respondents water and
the taking of the water would diminish their flow.
( 2) By the tearing out of dams. ( 3) They discussed
the retaking of their water with Richard Jackson
( 4) and he and his sons and the respondents and
the Jacksons together divided the water 1/12 to the
Jacksons and 11/12 to the respondents, their proportionate share of the Creek. (R 105, 109, 110-115,
118-119, 121-125, 129-130, 134-137, 143-145, 147149, 156-157, 163-164, 169-170, 180, 194-196.)
That the respondents were diligent in protecting their rights is further borne out by the fact that
they hired water masters and engineers to reconstruct their weirs and assist in the measurement of
the water. The first of these people were hired in
1927 and they consisted of the following: Mr. German and Jesse Read in 1927 (R 157-159), Mr.
Schaub in 1930 (R 147-148, 159-1 60), George D.
Clyde in 1933 through 1937 (R 160-161, 182), Mr.
Cox followed Gov. Clyde (R 140, 162-163). Also
see (R 134, 135, 157, 159, 160, 150, 161-163, 165,
169, 118-119.)
1

The foregoing evidence overwhelmingly sus19
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tains the trial court's findings that timely interruptions occurred during the period claimed. The Court
having found timely interruptions, it should be held
that appellants had not adversed the respondents, in
any manner whatsoever, and this is supported by
Wellsville East Field Irrigation Co. vs. Lindsay Land
and Livestock Co., supra.
In Justice Larson's concurring and dissenting
opinion, he said:
"I concur in the opinion, except as to the
part thereof holding that the claim of Lindsay
Land & Livestock Company must fail as to the
water used by Nichols. The opinion holds that
Nichols, predecessor in interest of Lindsay
Land & Livestock Co. had used these waters
adversely, ever since the Kimball Decree, but
there had never been a seven-year period without an interruption of the user, and lays down
the rule that a mere showing that the water
had once been turned out of the ditch of the
adverse user tolled the running of the sevenyear period. From that holding I emphatically
dissent. It is decidedly too broad for conditions prevailing in regard to the uses made of
the water under the record in this case. Furthermore, it is not in accord with the authorities.
The rule as stated may be correct where
the claimed right involves of necessity a constant, continuous possession and use. But here
irrigation '\Vater is generally not used continuously on the same lands. Irrigation is a
rotating process. The land is watered and then
the water is shut off for a period of time;
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then turned on for another soaking, and again
shut off. The uncontradicted evidence is that
Nichols used the water approximately two
days each ten days on one tract, from June
to September, inclusive, and on the other tract
during July, August and September. After
irrigating the land he would shut the water
off. Much of the time he did not have any
water on the land. The witnesses who testified
to turning water off from Nichols' ditches
testified in most cases they did not see Nichols.
Many times they did not even go down to
see if the 'vater was being used, or was flowing upon his land. On at least one occasion
when they saw Nichols using the water, they
asked him to cooperate and use it sparingly
because the stream was so small. He answered
that he was willing to cooperate and get along
with as little proportionately as did the other
users, and he would turn it off when he was
through. With that they left him to turn it
off when he finished his irrigating.
When water is claimed only for limited
periods of time, or in limited quantities, or
for limited purposes, interruptions in usage
must be such as to make an interruption of
such right as is claimed; must be such as to
molest or interfere with the use to the extent
it is claimed or asserted; to the extent of the
beneficial use claimed or usable. For example
where one claims a right to a11d usage of
water on Monday from 6:00 o'clock a.m. to
12:00 o'clock noon to irrigate an acre of strawberries, shutting off the flow on Tuesday
after the patch is watered is not an interference with, or interruption of the use. Of
course, when a constant continuous flow is
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claimed, any interruption in the flow is an
interruption in the use. * * *"
Justice Larson's opinion sustains our position,
however, we 'believe that the minority opinion as to
interruptions written by Judge Wolf, then Chief
Justice, and concurred in by Justice McDonough,
is a sounder view and we call the court's attention
to Pages 641-643, Pacific Reporter. This also supports our position.
We believe that the foregoing answers the position taken by the appellants in their brief. However,
we would like briefly to point out that the appellants predecessors in interest did not use the water
after the Call Decree without difficulties, as problems over the use of water required the respondents
to employ engineers to assist them in measuring
reconstructing weirs and dividing the water. Notwithstanding the appellants predecessors in interest,
the Jacksons in using the water assisted in dividing
it, and made no claims, so the respondents testified,
that they had a right to use the water in excess of
that decreed by Judge Call. (R 114-115, 129-130,
136, 139, 156, 163-164)
We agree there is evidence that some of the
respondents testified, except for dry years, that
they had adequate water for their lands above the
Woodruff Canal until the Canal Water was turned
off on July 1st. However, this was not the case as
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to others and it should be particularly kept in mind
that over 1100 acres of the respondents land receives
no water from the Canal.
We agree, also, there is evidence that appellants predecessors in interest continued to irrigate
355 acres and used the same ditches as were used
prior to 1919. However, an analysis of the evidence
shows that althou·gh they did not cut their acreage,
but the amount of water was definitely reduced;
they merely spread the available water over the
area. Mr. Nichols testified appellants predecessors in interest irrigated " . . . at it". (R 112)
and that although they didn't cut the acreage down
that they cut the water down (R 117) and Mr.
William Rex said he didn't see how they could irrigate the 355 acres as he was at times short of
water (R 130) and in this respect Ray Hoffman
testified that the Jacksons had irrigated all of their
lands under all of their ditches sometime of the
year. (17 4-175)
Irrespective of whether the Court believes the
Jacksons substantially irrigated 355 acres and that
some of respondents do not require all of their water
from Otter Creek before July 1st is immaterial,
as the only questions are whether Richard Jackson
could acquire an adverse right and if so whether
the respondents timely recaptured their water and
interrupted the Jackson in its use so as to destroy
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the running of the adverse period.
ADVERSE INTERESTS CANNOT BE ACQUIRED IN VIOLATION OF AN INJUNCTION
The appellants action is dependent on whether
Richard Jackson acquired an adverse interest between 1919 and 1939. This he could not do for adverse rights cannot be acquired in violation of a
court's injunction.
The appellants title is derived from James Jackson who acquired the property from his father Richard Jackson in 1940 (R 20-21). The Judge Call decree of 1919 perpetually enjoined Richard Jackson
and his successors in interest from using or diverting any more water than was necessary to irrigate
180 acres of land plus seepage, overflow and stock
watering rights. (Page 2 of Decree·, Case No. 43)
IT IS FURTHER CONSIDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant,
Richard Jackson, and all persons claiming by,
through, or under him, be, and they are hereby perpetually enjoined during the time from
the 1st day of April to the 1st day of November, of each and every year, from diverting
and using more than is necessary to irrigate
180 acres of his land, plus his respective share
of sepage _and underflow, as herein provided,
· and computed on the basis which 180 acres
bears to the total acreage of 2140 acres.
An act done in violation of an injunction is unavailable for the purpose intended.
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"* * * An act done in violation of injunc-

tion, being unlawful, is to be deemed ineffectual and unavailable as to the purpose intended as though it had not been done * * *".
28 Am. Jur. P 834, Sec. 322.
and in Farmworth vs. Fowler, 31 Tenn. (1 Swan)
1, 55 Am. Dec. 718, the Court said:
"As to the effect of the writ we may observe that it is directed to the defendant, and
its action is upon him in personam, and it
renders it unlawful in him to do the thing
prohibited or to fail or omit to do the thing
commanded. The act being unlawful, it is
deemed ineffectual and unavailable, as to the
purpose intended as though it had not been
done· * * *"
'
In Langford vs. Griffin, 17 S.W. 2d 296 the
Supreme Court of Arkansas held that a person
could not acquire adverse interests while subject
to an injunction. Davis the appellees predecessor
in interest was perpetually enjoined in 1896 from
enclosing or obstructing an alley. In 1898 Davis conveyed his property to his mother Emma Davis for
life with reversion to him at her death. She died
early in the year 1927. In August of that year Davis
conveyed to appellee by warranty deed. The appellee
claimed adverse right beginning 1902 through 1907
relying on the possession of John M. Davis' and his
mother. The Court said:
"Under the facts detailed above appellee's claim of title to the alley is necessarily a
claim of title thereto by adverse possession of
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himself, John M. David, and John M. Davis'
mother, Emn1a Davis. His deed from John M.
Davis in 1897 was for lot 6 and did not embrace the alley. If he obtained possession of
the alley from John M. Davis and John M.
Davis succeeded his mother in possession
thereof and the two of them inclosed the alley
in 1902 under an agreement between John M.
Davis and A. M. McKennon, who owned lot
8 on the south side of the alley, it was all in
violation of the decree rendered against John
M. Davis in favor of A. P. May in 1896, permanently enjoining him from entering into
possession of the alley. It is argued that
neither appellee nor Emma Davis were parties
to the injunction suit and were not and are
not bound by the decree rendered therein. In
this contention appellee is mistaken, for the
decree was binding upon John M. Davis and
all persons in privity of estate with him. Appellee's claim of title to the alley is based upon
his privity in estate thereto with John M.
Davis, else he has no claim at all. As John M.
Davis was enjoined from obstructing or entering into possession of the alley, the continuity of appellee's possession was necessarily
broken. In the face of the decree he could not
acquire title by continuous, adverse possession through John M. Davis.''
CONCLUSION

1. The respondents submit that Richard Jackson, the appellants predecessor in interest did not
acquire and could not acquire an adverse use to the
water claimed for the reason that any acts of his
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would be ineffectual in the face of the prohibition in
the Judge Call decree.
2. That the trial ·court having found interruptions as of June 1st, the respondents are entitled as a matter of law to a finding that the
appellants predecessor in interest, acquired no rights
by adverse use and this is so, whether the use is
claimed for the irrigation season, or to July 1, and
3. In any event the evidence sustains the findings of the trial court of interruptions as of June
1st and the evidence does not warrant the Court
to extend the adverse use to July 1st.
Respectfully submitted,
L. DELOS DAINES
822 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
DAVID R. DAINES
Cache Valley Bank Building
Logan, Utah
ZACHARY T. CHAPLIN
Logan, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents
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